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United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
To be eligible for withholding of removal, a noncitizen 
must show a clear probability of future persecution upon 
removal to her country of origin, so applicants granted 
withholding will necessarily have satisfied the lesser standard 
of a well-founded fear of persecution required for eligibility for 
asylum.  But while withholding is mandatory if the statutory 
criteria are satisfied, the decision to grant asylum is ultimately 
left to the discretion of the Attorney General and, between the 
two forms of relief, only the latter provides a pathway to legal 
permanent resident status and a basis to petition for admission 
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of family members as derivative asylees.  So the immigration 
regulations provide that when a petitioner is denied asylum but 
then granted withholding, the denial of asylum “shall be 
reconsidered,” and the factors the immigration judge (IJ) must 
consider “will include” not only the “reasons for the denial” 
but also “reasonable alternatives available” to the petitioner for 
family reunification.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e); accord id. 
§ 208.16(e).1   
Here, Petitioner alleges that the IJ failed to consider those 
factors and therefore abused his discretion.  We agree and thus 
will grant the petition, vacate the order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (the BIA or the Board), and remand with 
instructions that the IJ properly reconsider the denial of 
asylum.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 
Petitioner Santhakumar Sathanthrasa is a citizen of Sri 
Lanka, a country whose modern history has been marked by 
 
1 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(e) and 1208.16(e) are identical 
provisions, the latter of which applies to the BIA.  See Huang 
v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 90 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006).  The parties used 
these provisions interchangeably throughout the briefing, but 
for concision and consistency we will refer only to 
§ 1208.16(e). 
2 Sathanthrasa is entitled to “a rebuttable presumption of 
credibility on appeal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), because 
although the IJ indicated that he was not “overly enamored 
 4 
 
civil unrest and violence among the Sinhalese, Moor, and 
Tamil populations.  See Mohideen v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 567, 
568 (7th Cir. 2005).  Sathanthrasa is Tamil and seeks asylum 
based on the violence that ethnic minority group has faced at 
the hands of not only government forces, but also the Karuna 
Group (otherwise known as the People’s Liberation Tigers).  
The Karuna Group is a paramilitary organization led by a 
former commander of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), “a terrorist organization based in northern Sri Lanka” 
that waged a more-than-thirty-year-long “violent campaign to 
create an independent state for Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority.”  
Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2009).  
After the Karuna Group splintered from the LTTE movement, 
its members began working with the Sri Lankan Government 
to target Tamil men and women who were suspected LTTE 
members, Sathanthrasa among them.   
Sathanthrasa’s troubles began in 2007 when his three 
brothers were kidnapped by “unknown people.”  JA 89, 108, 
114.  One of his brothers was taken from a bus by “Navy 
Officers”; another was kidnapped at gunpoint by “unidentified 
persons” in front of his family; and the third was kidnapped by 
“some persons in a white van.”3  JA 145.  After two years 
 
with the respondent’s testimony,” JA 75, he declined to make 
an adverse credibility determination.   
3 Peaking in the late 2000s and continuing through most of 
the next decade, abductions of Tamils and political dissidents 
by individuals in white vans became such a widespread 
practice in Sri Lanka that victims were said to be “white 
vanned,” and the culture of violence became known as a “white 
van culture.”  JA 383–84; see also Brief of Professors of Sri 
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passed without word from his siblings, Sathanthrasa reported 
the kidnappings to the Human Rights Commission.  He did not 
ascribe blame to the Karuna Group, reporting only that his 
brothers were kidnapped by “unknown people.”  JA 113.  
Nonetheless, he faced swift retribution. 
One day when he was unloading cargo from a tractor, 
members of the Karuna Group forcibly dragged him into a 
white van and took him to a camp run by the Karuna Group.  
In the van and at the camp he was beaten, berated for reporting 
the kidnappings, and asked repeatedly whether he had received 
training from the LTTE, which he denied.  His abductors 
“twisted [his] arm, . . . hit [him], and kicked [him] with their 
boots on [his] chest.”  JA 116.  They eventually “pointed a 
small gun” at him and told him “to run away without turning 
and looking back.”  JA 115.  Fearing he would be shot, 
Sathanthrasa ran, first to a nearby church, then to his 
workplace, and next to a hospital, before finally seeking shelter 
in his father’s house.  The hospital diagnosed him with 
“internal injur[ies]” from the beatings, and he was later treated 
by an indigenous doctor.  JA 116.  
Several days after Sathanthrasa fled the camp, individuals 
in green uniforms, who Sathanthrasa alleged were members of 
either the Karuna Group or the army, came to his father’s house 
looking for him.  Sathanthrasa saw them approach and 
managed to escape out of the back of the house.  His father was 
not so lucky.  He was beaten after being interrogated about 
 
Lankan Politics as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 
8–9, DHS v. Thuraissigiam, No. 19-161 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2020), 
2020 WL 402612.  
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“where his son was” and responding that Sathanthrasa “had 
gone to work and . . . [would] not come back.”  JA 117–18.  
Eventually, the attackers left with the warning that once 
Sathanthrasa returned, he “should stay here without going 
anywhere, and [they] will come back.”  JA 118.   
Fearing for his safety, Sathanthrasa then fled to his uncle’s 
house, but there, yet another incident occurred.  Shortly after 
he arrived, armed members of Sri Lanka’s Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID) picked him up and took him 
to a police station, where he was detained for two days and 
interrogated on suspicion of being affiliated with the LTTE.  
Once released, Sathanthrasa worried that if he stayed at his 
uncle’s house he would “have [a] lot of trouble,” so he went to 
live with his aunt.  JA 119–20.   
Over the next six years, kidnappings remained 
commonplace, and although Sathanthrasa did not suffer 
additional threats or attacks during that period, he continued to 
fear that he would suffer the same fate as his siblings.  
Nonetheless, he did not leave Sri Lanka before 2016 because, 
as he testified, he “did not have money” to do so before then, 
and “therefore [he] had to later on borrow some money” before 
he was able to leave.  JA 129.  When the IJ inquired about the 
source of the funds, Sathanthrasa testified that he “had some 
money, . . . pawned jewelry, . . . mortgaged some property, 
[and] borrowed money from [his] father’s younger brother and 
[his] cousin.”  Id.  In the interim, Sathanthrasa lived openly, 
renting a house with his wife and their two children and 
working for a painting company without incident.   
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Upon entering the United States, Sathanthrasa petitioned 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT).  In support of these 
claims, Sathanthrasa testified before the IJ concerning the 
abuses he experienced in Sri Lanka and his belief that if he 
returns to Sri Lanka he will be taken into custody and tortured 
“because [he] went and spoke bad about the country, and 
because [he] made a complaint about [his] missing siblings.”  
JA 122.   
The IJ was persuaded only in part.  Before issuing his oral 
ruling, the IJ indicated that although he planned on granting 
withholding of removal, he would deny asylum.  In response 
to the protest of Sathanthrasa’s counsel that a denial of asylum 
would make it impossible for Sathanthrasa to reunite with his 
wife and children, the IJ responded that he was “not concerned 
about that” and that Sathanthrasa’s counsel was “getting into 
areas that [he] d[id not] care about” and that “ha[d] nothing to 
do with [his] decision.”  JA 138–39.  He then proceeded to 
announce his ruling. 
On the one hand, the IJ granted Sathanthrasa’s petition for 
withholding of removal based on the likelihood that 
Sathanthrasa would be “tortured or persecuted” as an LTTE 
sympathizer or a failed asylum seeker if he returned to Sri 
Lanka.  JA 77–78.  On the other hand, he denied Sathanthrasa’s 
petition for asylum on the grounds that Sathanthrasa’s abuse 
did not rise to the level of past persecution, that Sathanthrasa 
had waited “some seven years” after the last incident to flee to 
the United States, and that he was not in hiding during those 
intervening years.  JA 76–77.  Because the IJ granted 
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withholding, he declined to consider Sathanthrasa’s 
application for CAT protection.  
On Sathanthrasa’s appeal of the denial of asylum, the BIA 
promptly reversed and remanded.  Because asylum can be 
denied based on statutory ineligibility or as a matter of 
discretion and it was not clear which formed the basis for the 
IJ’s ruling, the Board directed the IJ to clarify his reasoning.  
And in view of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e)—which provides that a 
denial of asylum “shall be reconsidered” when “an applicant is 
denied asylum solely in the exercise of discretion . . . [and] is 
subsequently granted withholding of . . . removal under this 
section, thereby effectively precluding admission of the 
applicant’s spouse or minor children following to join him or 
her”—the BIA was explicit that if the denial was discretionary, 
the IJ was required to reconsider his asylum ruling, taking into 
account the “reasons for the denial” and “reasonable 
alternatives available to the applicant such as reunification 
with the spouse or minor children in a third country.”  JA 45 
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e)).    
With the case returned to him, the IJ clarified that he was 
denying asylum as a matter of discretion.  He identified two 
reasons for the denial: that Sathanthrasa’s abuse at the hands 
of the Karuna Group did not rise to the level of past persecution 
because he had suffered only minor injuries when he was 
beaten and that Sathanthrasa must have had an “ulterior 
motive” for traveling to the United States because his 
explanation for the delay was “wholly unpersuasive.”  JA 38–
39.  Left unaddressed were the issues of family reunification 
and the significance of Sathanthrasa’s well-founded fear of 
persecution, which the IJ had credited, for the discretionary 
denial of asylum.  In a footnote, the IJ stated that he had 
“considered 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(e) in this regard.”  JA 39 n.2.  
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So Sathanthrasa again appealed.  This time the BIA 
dismissed his petition, asserting that “the only positive factors 
[he had] identified were: (1) that his grant of withholding of 
removal was not as beneficial to him as asylum; and, (2) that 
Tamils have suffered a genocide.”  JA 8.  By way of reasoning, 
the BIA stated only that the IJ “was aware of the situation and 
its implications” and that it was “declin[ing] to disturb the 
[IJ’s] decision” because Sathanthrasa “ha[d] not identified 
error in the factors considered.”  Id.  Sathanthrasa timely 
petitioned this Court for review.  
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1103 and 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the IJ’s decision “where the 
BIA has substantially relied on that opinion,” S.E.R.L. v. Att’y 
Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Camara v. 
Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009)), and where the 
BIA has adopted the IJ’s decision and conducted its own 
analysis, “we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions,” id. 
(quoting Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att’y Gen., 837 F.3d 331, 341 (3d 
Cir. 2016)). 
We review a discretionary denial of asylum for abuse of 
discretion, Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D)), and we will remand if 
the decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” 
Tilija v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation 
omitted).   
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IV. DISCUSSION 
Because the Government does not contest that Sathanthrasa 
established both a well-founded fear of future persecution and 
eligibility for withholding of removal, the sole issue before us 
is whether the IJ failed to properly reconsider his discretionary 
denial of asylum as mandated by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e).4  To 
resolve this issue we address briefly the factors that guide a 
reconsideration of the discretionary denial of asylum under 
§ 1208.16(e) before reviewing the decision of the IJ in this 
case. 
 A. Reconsideration of a discretionary denial of  
  asylum 
In full, § 1208.16(e) provides:  
In the event that an applicant is denied asylum 
solely in the exercise of discretion, and the 
applicant is subsequently granted withholding of 
deportation or removal under this section, 
 
4 Some circuits have explored the question of whether the 
BIA itself may conduct the required reconsideration, see, e.g., 
Huang, 436 F.3d at 93, but the BIA itself seems to require 
remand to the IJ, see In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 176 (BIA 
2007).  In any event, given the nature of the fact-finding at 
issue here, as well as the BIA’s prior remand to the IJ for the 
reconsideration mandated by § 1208.16(e), we will remand 
with instructions that the Board follow that same procedure 
again. 
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thereby effectively precluding admission of the 
applicant’s spouse or minor children following 
to join him or her, the denial of asylum shall be 
reconsidered.  Factors to be considered will 
include the reasons for the denial and reasonable 
alternatives available to the applicant such as 
reunification with his or her spouse or minor 
children in a third country.   
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e); accord id. § 208.16(e).5   
 
5 In December 2019, the Department of Homeland Security 
issued a proposed rule that would eliminate both 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1208.16(e) and 208.16(e).  Procedures for Asylum and Bars 
to Asylum Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg. 69640-01 (proposed Dec. 
19, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 1208).  Because 
“administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive 
effect unless their language requires this result,” Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208  (1988)—and as 
the Government conceded at argument, the proposed rule 
contains no language stating that it will apply retroactively—
and because rules that “alter existing rights or obligations” may 
apply only prospectively, see Appalachian States Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Comm’n v. O’Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 113 (3d 
Cir. 1996); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (agency rules may have 
only “future effect”)); see Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 
F.3d 493, 506 (3d Cir. 2008), the proposed rule would apply 
only prospectively and would not control Sathanthrasa’s 
appeal.  Notably, however, the proposed rule also makes clear 
that family unification is, and would remain, a “crucial factor 
in weighing asylum as a discretionary matter.”  Procedures for 
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As our sister circuits have recognized, it is both logical and 
reasonable that reconsideration of asylum is mandatory for a 
petitioner in this “unusual legal status.”  Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 
F.3d 504, 508 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Huang, 436 F.3d at 95).  
That is because the petitioner has more than satisfied the “well-
founded fear of persecution” standard required for asylum by 
qualifying for withholding of removal.  Ghebrehiwot v. Att’y 
Gen., 467 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)).  At the same time, however, having won only 
withholding of removal, that same petitioner will be “ineligible 
to become a lawful permanent resident here, unable to reunite 
his family as derivative asylees, and subject to deportation to a 
willing third country.”  Zuh, 547 F.3d at 508.  
To understand what is required on reconsideration under 
§ 1208.16(e), we must begin with what is required in the 
normal course.  For while an IJ’s reconsideration of asylum 
under § 1208.16(e) may be mandatory, the granting of asylum 
is not.  Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 214 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  To be sure, a petitioner seeking asylum must 
establish statutory eligibility by demonstrating either 
“persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see id. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(A).  But statutory eligibility for asylum does not 
give rise to a “right to remain in the United States.”  INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987) (emphasis 
 
Asylum and Bars to Asylum Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg. at 69,657 
(quoting Fisenko v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 287, 292 (6th Cir. 2016)). 
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omitted).  The petitioner must carry her burden of “establishing 
that the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted,” Huang, 
436 F.3d at 97, and the grant of asylum—ab initio or on 
reconsideration—ultimately rests in the Attorney General’s 
discretion.  Id. at 95; see Serrano-Alberto, 859 F.3d at 214. 
But that discretion is not limitless.  “[T]he BIA has 
established—and federal courts have enforced—extensive 
limitations on an IJ’s exercise of discretion.”  Huang, 436 F.3d 
at 97 (collecting cases).  Even on initial consideration of 
asylum, the IJ “must examine the totality of the circumstances” 
to determine whether a petitioner is entitled to a discretionary 
grant of asylum.  Id. at 98; accord Zuh, 547 F.3d at 510–11.   
Our sister circuits have helpfully set forth a non-exhaustive 
list of positive and negative factors that we also adopt today to 
guide the IJ’s exercise of discretion in assessing an asylum 
application.  See, e.g., Huang, 436 F.3d at 98 (collecting cases).  
Positive factors include:  
1) Family, business, community, and 
employment ties to the United States, and length 
of residence and property ownership in this 
country; 
2) Evidence of hardship to the alien and his 
family if deported to any country, or if denied 
asylum such that the alien cannot be reunited 
with family members (as derivative asylees) in 
this country; 
3) Evidence of good character, value, or service 
to the community, including proof of genuine 
rehabilitation if a criminal record is present; 
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4) General humanitarian reasons, such as age or 
health; [and] 
5) Evidence of severe past persecution and/or 
well-founded fear of future persecution, 
including consideration of other relief granted or 
denied the applicant (e.g., withholding of 
removal or CAT protection).  
Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511; see also Shahandeh-Pey v. INS, 831 F.2d 
1384, 1387 (7th Cir. 1987) (listing positive factors).  
Negative factors include:  
1) Nature and underlying circumstances of the 
exclusion ground; 
2) Presence of significant violations of 
immigration laws;6  
 
6 We note that while violations of immigration laws are 
properly part of the inquiry, see, e.g., In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 316, 345 n.12 (Att’y Gen. 2018), overruled in other part 
by Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018), “this 
factor itself involves a totality of the circumstances inquiry,” 
including whether the violation stemmed from an imminent 
need to escape persecution, Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511 n.4; In re 
Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 472–75 (BIA 1987), superseded in 
other part by regulation as recognized in Andriasian v. INS, 
180 F.3d 1033, 1043–44 & n. 17 (9th Cir. 1999); see also In re 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368 (BIA 1996). 
 15 
 
3) Presence of a criminal record and the nature, 
recency, and seriousness of that record, 
including evidence of recidivism; 
4) Lack of candor with immigration officials, 
including an actual adverse credibility finding by 
the IJ; [and] 
5) Other evidence that indicates bad character or 
undesirability for permanent residence in the 
United States. 
Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511 (footnote omitted); see also Shahandeh-
Pey, 831 F.2d at 1388 (listing negative factors).  
In weighing these factors and making a discretionary 
asylum determination, an IJ need not expressly address every 
factor, “[b]ut at the very least, [the] IJ must demonstrate that 
he or she reviewed the record and balanced the relevant factors 
and must discuss the positive or adverse factors that support 
his or her decision.”  Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511; see Gulla v. 
Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2007); Huang, 436 F.3d 
at 98–99; In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989).  This 
explicit requirement of balancing is consonant with the 
principle that we may affirm an agency’s decision only on “the 
grounds invoked by the agency” and the concomitant rule that 
those grounds “must be set forth with such clarity as to be 
understandable.”  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947); see Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 
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2005) (same); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 241 (3d Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (same).7   
These lessons apply to both the original consideration of 
asylum and its reconsideration under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e).  
But when it comes to reconsideration of a discretionary denial 
of asylum under § 1208.16(e), four points bear particular 
emphasis.   
First, where a petitioner has satisfied the even more 
demanding standard for persecution for withholding of 
removal, a fortiori she has demonstrated a well-founded fear 
of future persecution, and a well-founded fear of persecution 
“outweigh[s] all but the most egregious adverse factors.”  Zuh, 
547 F.3d at 512 (alteration in original) (quoting Huang, 436 
F.3d at 98); see Marouf v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 174, 180 (6th Cir. 
2016) (cataloging a handful of cases in which “egregious 
conduct” justified the “unusual” outcome of a discretionary 
denial of asylum (citations omitted)); Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 
F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004); Shahandeh-Pey, 831 F.2d at 
1388; In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (BIA 1996) (en 
banc); In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 348 (1996) (en banc).  
That is so even when a petitioner has been granted another 
form of relief, such as withholding.  See Zuh, 547 F.3d at 512 
n.5; Huang, 436 F.3d at 98 n.11.  Otherwise, “those very 
asylum-seekers who met the higher standard of proof of 
persecution required for withholding of removal (and thus 
 
7 The balancing requirement can be satisfied, however, so 
long as the IJ sets forth his or her reasoning with sufficient 
clarity.  Chenery does not command that both the IJ and BIA 
expressly set forth their reasoning.  Dia, 353 F.3d at 243. 
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those persons most in need of this nation’s asylum relief) 
would be the ones who received less protection.”  Zuh, 547 
F.3d at 512 n.5 (quoting Huang, 436 F.3d at 98 n.11).   
Second, in making any discretionary asylum determination, 
an IJ should consider “[e]vidence of hardship to the alien and 
his family if . . . denied asylum such that the alien cannot be 
reunited with family members (as derivative asylees) in this 
country.”  Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511.  But this factor must be 
considered on reconsideration of the discretionary denial of 
asylum under § 1208.16(e).  As the regulation makes clear by 
its terms, its primary purpose is to address the fact that “[i]n 
the event that an applicant is denied asylum solely in the 
exercise of discretion . . . [and] is subsequently granted 
withholding of . . .  removal,” the discretionary denial of 
asylum “thereby effectively preclud[es] admission of the 
applicant’s spouse or minor children following to join him or 
her.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e).  That is because only an asylee 
can petition to have family members enter the United States as 
derivative asylees.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A).  With that 
precious possibility at stake, the regulation ensures that 
“[f]actors to be considered will include . . . reasonable 
alternatives available to the applicant such as reunification 
with his or her spouse or minor children in a third country.”  
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e) (emphasis added). 
Third, it is not sufficient on reconsideration for the IJ to 
consider and address only the factor of reasonably available 
alternatives to family reunification.  While that factor carries 
significant weight, the IJ must also consider the “reasons for 
the denial” of asylum.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e).  By mandating 
that the IJ consider the “reasons for the denial and reasonable 
alternatives” for family reunification in the conjunctive, id. 
(emphasis added), the regulation makes clear that a de novo 
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reweighing of the positive and negative factors is required.  See 
Alimbaev v. Att’y Gen., 872 F.3d 188, 201 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(instructing that on remand, the immigration agency must 
reconsider the factor on which it erred “before [then] weighing 
the various positive and negative factors”).  In that reweighing, 
moreover, the IJ must pay special attention to the availability 
of “reasonable alternatives” for family reunification, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(e), and to the principle that a well-founded fear of 
persecution “outweigh[s] all but the most egregious adverse 
factors,” Zuh, 547 F.3d at 512 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). 
Fourth, the need for the IJ to identify and discuss the factors 
informing her decision is all the more acute on reconsideration 
under § 1208.16(e).  “Discretionary denials of asylum are 
exceedingly rare,” Huang, 436 F.3d at 92, and are “even more 
rare when the IJ or BIA has found the applicant entitled to 
withholding of removal,” Zuh, 547 F.3d at 507.  For that 
reason, they are carefully scrutinized by the Courts of Appeals 
and have been vacated where the IJ failed to balance the 
relevant factors, see Huang, 436 F.3d at 99; see also 
Shahandeh-Pey, 831 F.2d at 1387–90; where the IJ’s 
conclusion was internally inconsistent, see Marouf, 811 F.3d 
at 190; Zuh, 547 F.3d at 513; or where the IJ failed to provide 
sufficient explanation for the reviewing court to determine that 
she “heard, considered, and decided” the issue, Kalubi, 364 
F.3d at 1141 (citation omitted).  In the ordinary course, an IJ is 
expected to “demonstrate that he or she reviewed the record 
and balanced the relevant factors and [to] discuss the positive 
or adverse factors that support his or her decision,” Zuh, 547 
F.3d at 511; when reconsidering the discretionary denial of 
asylum under § 1208.16(e), a thoughtful balancing and robust 
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discussion is essential both to ensure the IJ’s decision is sound 
and to render it capable of meaningful review. 
 B. Application to the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions 
With these principles in mind, we readily conclude that the 
IJ here did not properly reconsider his discretionary denial of 
asylum under § 1208.16(e) and that the BIA erred in finding it 
sufficient that the IJ “was aware of the situation and its 
implications,” JA 8.   
First, having determined that Sathanthrasa had a well-
founded fear of persecution, the IJ should have considered that 
factor to “outweigh[] all but the most egregious adverse 
factors.”  Zuh, 547 F.3d at 512.  Instead, the IJ grounded the 
discretionary denial of asylum on Sathanthrasa’s failure to 
establish past persecution and his purported “ulterior motive” 
for traveling to the United States.  JA 39.  The IJ made no 
mention of the weight to be accorded Sathanthrasa’s well-
founded fear of persecution, nor did he explain how the factors 
he identified were sufficiently egregious to outweigh the 
credible threat of harm Sathanthrasa faced if returned to Sri 
Lanka.  See Zuh, 547 F.3d at 512; Huang, 436 F.3d at 98, 100; 
Shahandeh-Pey, 831 F.2d at 1388.   
Second, family reunification should have been treated as 
relevant both to the IJ’s original decision and on his 
reconsideration.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e); Huang, 436 F.3d 
at 101; In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 176 (BIA 2007).  Yet 
on neither occasion was that factor clearly considered.  In the 
first instance, the IJ stated that he was “not concerned” and 
“d[id not] care about” family reunification.  JA 138–39.  He 
even went so far as to assert that family reunification “ha[d] 
nothing to do with [his] decision.”  JA 139.  And on 
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reconsideration, even though the BIA remanded with specific 
instructions to consider family circumstances, the IJ failed to 
mention, much less discuss, family reunification, relegating to 
a footnote the cryptic comment that he “ha[d] considered 
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(e) in this regard.”  JA 39 n.2.  That cursory 
treatment only reinforces our concern that the IJ indeed treated 
family unification as having “nothing to do with [his] 
decision,” JA 139.  See Zuh, 547 F.3d at 512 (citing Huang, 
436 F.3d at 99). 
Third, although § 1208.16(e) requires reconsideration of 
the “reasons for the denial,” there is no indication in the record 
that the IJ engaged in a de novo balancing of factors on 
reconsideration.  He failed to discuss any positive factors 
weighing in favor of asylum, inexplicably ignoring both 
Sathanthrasa’s well-founded fear of persecution, which he 
credited for purposes of withholding of removal, and the 
regulation’s express requirement of consideration of family 
reunification.  Instead, the IJ recited, almost verbatim, the same 
negative factors he originally identified as grounds for his 
initial denial of asylum, namely Sathanthrasa’s failure to 
establish past persecution and his “ulterior motive” for 
traveling to the United States.  JA 38–39.  The IJ’s treatment 
of those negative factors was problematic in and of itself.8  But 
 
8 First, as intervening case law has made clear, violence and 
threats of violence must be considered cumulatively for 
purposes of assessing past persecution.  See Doe v. Att’y Gen., 
956 F.3d 135, 143–44 (3d Cir. 2020); Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y 
Gen., 952 F.3d 101, 106–07 (3d Cir. 2020) (collecting cases).  
Yet the IJ focused only on the facts that Sathanthrasa had not 
been “serious[ly]” injured by the Karuna Group or beaten by 
the police and had not suffered further abuse after 2009.  JA 
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even accepting those factors at face value, the IJ erred in failing 
to explain why those factors should be considered among “the 
most egregious adverse factors” capable of outweighing not 
only Sathanthrasa’s well-founded fear of persecution but also 
 
38.  In doing so, the IJ failed to consider the kidnappings of 
Sathanthrasa’s three siblings; his father’s beating; his mother’s 
testimony that she was held at gunpoint while one of his 
brothers was abducted; the threat that he would be killed when 
members of the Karuna Group pointed a gun at him and told 
him to “run away without turning and looking back,” JA 115; 
or the cryptic threat that he should stay at his father’s house 
“without going anywhere” because his father’s attackers would 
“come back,” JA 118.  Second, an adverse credibility 
determination is not properly based on an absence of testimony 
when “no one ever asked” the petitioner for clarification.  See 
Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 
Dia, 353 F.3d at 250 (an adverse credibility determination must 
be based on “specific, cogent reason[s]” not “speculation, 
conjecture, or an otherwise unsupported personal opinion”).  
But while neither the Government nor the IJ requested an 
explanation from Sathanthrasa, the IJ discredited his stated 
reason for his delayed departure on the ground that he “did not 
explain why his family could not have simply sold their 
personal property much earlier.”  JA 38.  Because we conclude 
the IJ’s failure to weigh family reunification in the mix requires 
a remand for full reconsideration of the discretionary denial of 
asylum, Huang, 436 F.3d at 101, including the “reasons for the 
denial,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e), there will be ample opportunity 
on remand for the IJ to reconsider the past persecution 
determination and to explore Sathanthrasa’s stated reason for 
his delay in leaving Sri Lanka with these cases in mind. 
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the hardship he would suffer if he could not reunite with his 
wife and children.  See Zuh, 547 F.3d at 512 (citation omitted); 
Huang, 436 F.3d at 98–99, 102 (remanding to the agency when 
the IJ abused his discretion by focusing only on negative 
factors); Shahandeh-Pey, 831 F.2d at 1388–90.   
The BIA then compounded these errors by concluding, 
without analysis, that the IJ was aware of “the only [two] 
positive factors” Sathanthrasa had identified: (1) that a “grant 
of withholding of removal was not as beneficial to him” as a 
grant of asylum; and (2) that “Tamils have suffered a 
genocide.”  JA 8.  The implication from the BIA’s opinion and 
the thrust of the Government’s argument on appeal is that 
Sathanthrasa failed to carry his burden of identifying positive 
factors that weighed in favor of a discretionary grant of asylum.  
But while the burden of establishing entitlement to a 
discretionary grant of asylum rests on the petitioner, Huang, 
436 F.3d at 97, special considerations apply on reconsideration 
pursuant to § 1208.16(e).  At that point, not only has the 
petitioner established a well-founded fear of persecution, but 
also the IJ must consider family circumstances.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(e).  An IJ who fails to follow those mandates—or 
worse, disavows them—necessarily abuses her discretion.  Cf. 
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 254 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
Government’s position to the contrary is particularly baffling 
on the record before us:  Why should we fault Sathanthrasa for 
failing to present evidence of the hardships caused by family 
separation when the IJ short-circuited that discussion by 
stating, over the objections of Sathanthrasa’s counsel, that he 
was “not concerned about that,” JA 138, and that it had 
“nothing to do with [his] decision,” JA 139?   
Finally, the explications of the IJ and BIA leave much to be 
desired.  The sole indication that the IJ understood his duty to 
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reconsider a discretionary denial of asylum is the stray footnote 
stating he had “considered 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(e).”  JA 39 n.2.  
That passing mention does not allow us, as the reviewing court, 
to determine that he “heard, considered, and decided” the issue.  
Kalubi, 364 F.3d at 1141 (citation omitted).  To the contrary, it 
leaves us with nothing of substance to review.  Cf. Awolesi v. 
Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]o give 
meaningful review to the BIA’s decision, we must have some 
insight into its reasoning.”).  The BIA’s opinion is no less 
concerning:  The sole justification for its affirmance was its 
assertion that the IJ “was aware of the situation and its 
implications.”  JA 8.  We do not share that confidence in view 
of the internal inconsistency of the IJ’s crediting 
Sathanthrasa’s well-founded fear of persecution for purposes 
of withholding but not for asylum, the IJ’s explicit refusal to 
consider family circumstances, and the absence of any 
indication that the IJ conducted a de novo review of the factors 
weighing for and against asylum.  
III. CONCLUSION 
In sum, because the IJ did not reconsider the discretionary 
denial of asylum in this case in the manner required by 
§ 1208.16(e) and our case law, he abused his discretion.  
Accordingly, we will grant Sathanthrasa’s petition, vacate the 
BIA’s order, and remand to the BIA with instructions for the 
IJ to properly reconsider the discretionary denial of asylum.  
